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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
From the standpoint of legal analysis, the theory of recovery
as presented in the instant decision is preferable since it avoids
the use of fiction. However, it is believed that the instant theory
should not be applied as broadly as stated- that a cause of
action for prenatal injuries should arise only in those instances
where the infant survives birth and the injurious condition
arises subsequent to conception. 21 It appears that the instant
theory thus modified is as applicable in Louisiana as in other
jurisdictions.
Gerald LeVan
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION - ACCIDENTS ARISING OUT OF
AND IN THE COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT
Plaintiff, the widow of a former captain on the city police
force, brought suit against the City of Baton Rouge under the
Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Statute for the death of
her husband. In a physical examination the captain had been
found to be physically unfit for all duty except desk work.
Within a few months, the Chief of Police forwarded to him a
letter which in effect demanded his retirement. The trial court
found from the undisputed testimony of the deceased's physician
that the resulting emotional upset was a cause in fact of the
ensuing heart attack,' and recovery was allowed. On appeal to
the Louisiana court of appeal, held, reversed. Death caused from
agitation over retirement and occurring while on vacation
neither arises out of nor occurs in the course of the employer's
trade, business, or occupation. Seals v. Baton Rouge, 94 So.2d
478 (La. App. 1957).
Section 1031 of the Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Act
provides that "if an employee . . . receives personal injury by
accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, his
ceived." LA. CIVIM CODE art. 28 (1870). Youman v. McConnell, 7 La. App. 317
(1927).
21. It is felt that should the infant survive birth and afterwards die from
prenatal injuries an action for wrongful death would be appropriate. See Heins
v. Guzman, Orleans No. 9484 (La. App. 1924) (unreported) ; Janinsky v. Potts,
153 Ohio St. 529, 92 N.E.2d 809 (1950).
1. The trial court noted that the cause in fact could have been of extreme sig-
nificance. In heart attack cases, the crucial issue is often cause in fact, even
where the accident is of a physical nature. In this particular case, however, this
issue was not contested by the defendant. In this connection, see Neldare v.
Schuylkill Products Co., 107 So.2d 487 (La. App. 1958), noted in 19 LOUISIANA
LAW REviEw 916 (1959) ; Kraemer v. Jahncke Services, 83 So.2d 916 (La. App.
1955).
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employer shall pay compensation."' 2 (Emphasis added.) The gen-
eral rule in Louisiana and in other jurisdictions is that the in-
quiry as to "in the course of employment" is concerned with the
time, place, and circumstances of the accident. 3 On the other
hand, the requirement that the injury must "arise out of the
employment" leads to an examination of the origin of the risk
which causes the injury. 4 Although theoretically the two require-
ments should lead to different inquiries, they are, nevertheless,
interrelated, and the courts will often consider them together.
For example, where there is a particularly strong showing that
the injury occurred during the course of employment, i.e., that
the employee was actively at work at the time of the accident,
the court will award compensation without being too concerned
with the origin of the risk.5 This was the position taken by
the Louisiana Supreme Court in the leading case of Kern v.
Southport Mill.6 As stated therein, it is sufficient to justify an
2. LA. R.S. 23:1031 (1950).
3. Fields v. Brown Paper Mill Co., 28 So.2d 755 (La. App. 1956). See also
MALONE, LOUISIANA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 162
(1951) and LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 6.10 (1952).
4. Myers v. Louisiana Ry. & Nay. Co., 140 La. 937, 74 So. 256 (1917). " See
also MALONE, LOUISIANA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 162
(1951) and LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 6.10 (1952).
5. Humphreys v. Marquette Casualty Co., 235 La. 355, 103 So.2d 895 (1958)
(where employee suffers an injury while following the orders of his 'employer,
the employer is estopped from asserting the defense that the injury did not arise
out of the employment) ; Dobson v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 228 La., 837, 84
So.2d 210 (1955). In Edwards v. Louisiana Forestry Commission, 221 La. 818,
60 So.2d 449 (1952), a towerman was injured while climbing down to rescue a
child who was being attacked by a large dog. In granting an award, the court
relied strongly on the United States Supreme Court case of O'Leary v. Brown-
Pacific-Maxon, Inc., 340 U.S. 504 (1951), which presented a similar factual sit-
uation. The court held that the injury did arise out of the employment. In Harvey
v. Caddo DeSoto Cotton Oil Co., 199 La. 720, 6 So.2d 747 (1942), an employee
was killed during a cyclone while at work in the defendant's hull house. The court
found that the injury did arise out of the employment, and compensation was
awarded. In Livingston v. Henry & Hall, 59 So.2d 892 (La. App. 1952), an em-
ployee was shot and killed while doing construction work. The assailant was not
connected with the employment, and only by chance did he find the deceased while
he was at work. Nevertheless, the court found that the injury did arise out of
the employment, and compensation was awarded. In Green v. Heard Motor Co.,
53 So.2d 700 (La. App. 1951), a car salesman, while waiting for a prospective
customer, accepted the invitation of a third party to go for a ride in his airplane.
The plane crashed and the salesman was killed. The injury did arise out of the
employment. In Favre v. Werk Press Mfg. Co., 152 So. 694 (La. App. 1934) the
plaintiff was hit in the eye with an alligator pear seed as the result of horseplay
by two other employees and the court held the accident arose out' of the employ-
ment. The plaintiff recovered. But see Leckie v. H. D. Foot Lumber Co.,' 40 So.2d
249 (La. App. 1948), in which an employee, while at work in a sawmill, injured
his thumb while sawing a piece of wood for his own use. With Judge Kennon dis-
senting, the court held that the injury did not arise out' of the employment.
6. 174 La. 432, 141 So. 19 (1932). Compensation was awarded to a pipefitter
who was hit by an automobile when he stepped from a streetcar into the street.
He was returning from an outside job. The court said: "In determining whether
an accident 'arose out of the employment,' it is necessary to consider only this:
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award if the employee was at the scene of the accident because
of his employer's business, and not due to his own personal
desires. Such a standard involves only the time, place, and cir-
cumstances of the accident, and obviates the necessity of any
inquiry as to the origin of the risk. Where the employee is not
actively at work at the time of the accident, his showing that the
injury occurred during the course of employment will, of course,
be weaker. In these situations, the court will usually deny a re-
covery in the absence of a relatively strong indication that the
origin of the risk which caused the injury was connected with
the employment.7 An examination of the jurisprudence reveals
that the courts have used the terms interchangeably at times,
and awards have been denied on the ground that the injury did
not arise out of the employment where the main problem would
appear to be whether the injury occurred during the course of
employment." For this reason it is difficult to formulate rules
based on the language of the courts.9
The facts of the instant case present a situation in which the
plaintiff's case appears to have been rather weak with respect to
both requirements. However, because the letter was an official
(1) Was the employee then engaged about his employer's business and not merely
pursuing his own 'business or pleasure; and (2) did the necessities of the em-
ployer's business reasonably require that the employee be at the place of the acci-
dent at the time the accident occurred?" Id. at 438, 141 So. at 21.
7. In Warren v. Globe Indemnity Co., 217 La. 142, 46 So.2d 66 (1950), a travel-
ing salesman went to Olla, Louisiana, on a business trip. After waiting in vain
to see his business contact, he drove to Winnfield, Louisiana, picked up his girl
friend, and went out for dinner. After eating they visited a friend of the girl,
and while returning to her house the salesman was killed in an automobile acci-
dent. The evidence was not conclusive as to whether he was going back to Olla
that night to see the business contact. The court denied compensation on the
ground that the accident did not arise out of the employment. In Laine v. Junca,
207 La. 280, 21 So.2d 150 (1945), the employee departed from his normal duties
on the ranch to help another employee herd mules into a catchpen. While so doing,
he was hit in the eye with the end of a whip. The court denied compensation on
the ground that the injury did not arise out of the employment. It is significant,
however, that the court took notice of the fact that this employment did not appear
to be of a hazardous nature, as required by the statute. In Jinks v. Burton Sutton
Oil Co., 44 So.2d 343 (La. App. 1950), the employee was killed during working
hours, but while on the way to his home. With the employer's permission, he had
left work early and had dropped off some maps prior to the accident. The court
held that the accident did not arise out of the employment. In Como v. Union Sul-
phur Co., 182 So. 155 (La. App. 1938), the plaintiff departed from his employ-
ment of supervising construction work on the Calcasieu River, and went dynamit-
ing for fish with other employees. The injury did not arise out of the employment.
8. Warren v. Globe Indemnity Co., 217 La. 142, 46 So.2d 66 (1950) ; Laine v.
Junca, 207 La. 280, 21 So.2d 150 (1945) ; Rodgers v. Price, 92 So.2d 305 (La.
App. 1957) ; Jinks v. Burton Sutton Oil Co., 44 So.2d 343 (La. App. 1950).
9. The court was early to recognize and has continued to note that no rules
can be formulated which would be applicable to every situation. See Edwards v.
Louisiana Forestry Commission, 221 La. 818, 60 So.2d 450 (1952) ; Myers v. Lou-
isiana Ry. & Nay. Co., 140 La. 937, 74 So. 256 (1917) ; Cudahy Packing Co. v.
Parramore, 263 U.S. 418 (1923).
communication which was received as an employee and not in
relation to private affairs, the trial court found that the injury
happened in the course of the employment. 10 It was implied that
the hour and place at which the letter was received were imma-
terial. The court then proceeded to find that the accident arose
out of the employment because it was the duty of the deceased
to receive official communications, and although this communi-
cation was one of unusual character, this duty was still present.
The court of appeal, however, found that neither of the require-
ments were satisfied, but it is difficult to determine what test
was applied. It has been suggested that this problem might best
be approached by using a "work' connection" theory." Under
this view the court would make separate inquiries into (1) the
time, place, and circumstances of the accident; and (2) into the
origin of the risk. If, after considering both factors, there is
sufficient connection between the accident and the employment,
an award would be justified. This would enable a strong case in
one respect to overcome a weakness that might appear as to the
other. Whether or not the court of appeal was using such an
approach is not apparent from the opinion, but it is submitted
that under the work connection theory, the award would have
been denied.
An examination of the time, place, and circumstances of re-
ceiving the letter leads this writer to conclude that the plaintiff's
case as to the requirement that the injury occur in the course of
employment was weak. Certainly it would have been strength-
ened if it had been shown that the deceased was actively at work
when he received the communication. 2 On the basis of prior
jurisprudence, compensation should be denied in the instant
factual situation unless there is a relatively strong showing that
the injury arose out of the employment. The risk of receiving a
letter of retirement is one to which all employees would be sub-
jected, assuming that their employment continues long enough.
The court of appeal did not feel that the statute was designed to
protect against injuries which result from risks of this nature,
and stated that a holding to the contrary would put every em-
10. The reasoning used by the trial court to find that the accident occurred
during the course of employment is difficult for this writer to follow. That the
letter was one which was sent from a superior officer to one of his subordinates
appears to refer to the origin of the risk rather than the time, place, and circum-
stances.
11. See LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 29 (1952).
12. The opinion does not reveal with any certainty where the deceased was
when he received the communication, but from the opinion of the trial court the
implication is that he was not on duty.
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ployer into a quandary as to discharge or forced retirement of
his employees. It is interesting to speculate as to what effect a
change in the factual situation might have had on the decision.
As previously mentioned, had the deceased been actively at work
when the letter was received, his argument as to "in the course"
would have been strengthened considerably. Had the letter con-
tained material which had more connection with his particular
employment, such as the escape of a convict who had threatened
him, then the case as to "arising out of" would have been
strengthened. It cannot be said that one or both of these factual
changes would have resulted in an award of compensation, but
certainly in such a case, a stronger argument in favor of such an
award would have existed.
Peyton Moore
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION - DEATH BENEFITS - RIGHT OF
POSTHUMOUS ILLEGITIMATE TO BENEFIT PAYMENTS
Plaintiff sued for compensation on behalf of her minor child.
The father and mother of the child lived together in open con-
cubinage while the father was still legally married to another
woman. The child was born eight months after its father was
accidentally killed during the course of his employment. The
trial court denied recovery but was reversed by the court of
appeal.' On appeal to the Louisiana Supreme Court, held, re-
versed, two Justices dissenting. Since a posthumous illegitimate
is not a member of the family and not actually dependent, he is
not entitled to recover compensation benefits under the Louisi-
ana Workmen's Compensation Statute. Williams v. American
Employers Insurance Co., 237 La. 101, 110 So.2d 541 (1959).
Under the Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Statute, if an
industrial accident causes death within two years, a worker's
dependents may receive benefit payments. 2 Dependents are
classified as (1) those conclusively presumed to be dependent,8
and (2) those who must prove actual dependency.4 Legitimate
children, legitimate adopted children, legitimate posthumous
children, legitimate stepchildren, and illegitimate children ac-
knowledged under Articles 203, 204, and 205 of the Louisiana
1. Williams v. American Employers Ins. Co., 103 So.2d 568 (La. App. 1958).
2. LA. R.S. 23:1231 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1956, No. 412.
3. Id. 23:1251.
4. Id. 23:1252.
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